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 “CARROTS FOR CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY”: IMPACTS OF INCENTIVE 
INCLUSIVENESS AND VARIETY ON ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we explore the role that managerial incentives play in improving 
corporate environmental performance finding that greater inclusiveness of incentive 
beneficiaries and greater variety of incentive types are important factors in firms’ incentive 
schemes. Drawing on a large dataset of multinational enterprises our results suggest that 
generally including more beneficiaries from different levels within the corporate hierarchy 
and offering both monetary and non-monetary rewards are more likely to lead to reductions 
in corporate greenhouse gas emissions. Developing two principles of incentive design, 
inclusiveness and variety, and the conceptualization of patterns of these in organizations as 
configurations of incentives, our research contributes substantially to normative advice 
regarding the relative effectiveness of alternative systems of environmental incentives. Such 
an understanding of the potential of incentives is critical to informing how firms address 
complex problems such as sustainability in the context of increasingly extended 
organizational hierarchies and designs. 
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“CARROTS FOR CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY”: IMPACTS OF INCENTIVE 
INCLUSIVENESS AND VARIETY ON ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
 
A growing body of research examines companies’ efforts to reduce their environmental 
impacts in general (Cordano and Frieze, 2000; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Russo and Harrison, 
2005), and specifically their carbon emissions (Jeswani et al., 2008; Kolk and Pinkse, 2005; 
Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Sprengel and Busch, 2011; Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 2010). 
Extant research often focuses on conceptualizing the influences on corporate environmental 
improvements (Vidal et al., 2015; Wassmer et al., 2014), or empirically exploring the role of 
(extra-)organizational factors, such as pressure from external stakeholders, firm size, industry 
sector, and corporate governance, in shaping environmental outcomes (Bansal, 2005; Bansal 
and Roth, 2000; Clarke and Crawford, 2012; Kock et al., 2012). In this context, a newly 
emerging stream of research addresses the merits of incentivizing the achievement of 
individual and organizational goals, especially where they relate to the improvement of 
environmental outcomes (Ioannou et al., 2016; Kolk and Perego, 2014; Maas, 2016; Maas 
and Rosendaal, 2016). This research draws upon well-established evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of motivating employees with goal-oriented rewards or performance 
improvement incentives (e.g., Bruce et al., 2005; Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Gerhart et al., 
2009; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004).  
However, much of the empirical research on the effects of incentives is either focused 
on the impact of providing incentives exclusively to the upper echelons within organizations 
(Bruce et al., 2005; Maas, 2016; Mishra and Gobeli, 1998; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004), or to 
teams and individuals embedded within middle and lower layers of corporate hierarchies 
(Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; Knight et al., 2001). Similarly, in the context of corporate 
sustainability, studies have so far focused on incentives provided either to executives and 
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senior managers (e.g., Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Ioannou et al., 2016; Kock et al., 
2012; Kolk and Perego, 2014; Rodrigue et al., 2013) or to plant managers (Russo and 
Harrison, 2005). As a result, extant research largely investigates the impacts and 
effectiveness of incentives at distinct organizational levels rather than taking a holistic 
perspective on the presence, and types, of incentives across the layers of organizations. Thus, 
there is a lack of empirical research that takes a comprehensive view of the role of incentives 
in shaping environmental outcomes in organizations, often because of the limitations of the 
data available (Parisi, 2013; Wageman and Baker, 1997; Wellbourne et al., 1995). 
Additionally, research on environmental incentives often fails to distinguish between the 
forms and types of incentives introduced. Hence, while incentives for environmental 
improvement are increasingly popular in practice and the subject of a growing literature 
(Bashford, 2008; Fernandez et al. 2003; Renwick et al., 2014), there is to the best of our 
knowledge no comprehensive study that seeks to evaluate the impacts of environmental 
incentives on environmental outcomes by reflecting the variety of forms and beneficiaries of 
incentives being deployed in many contemporary organizations.  
Therefore, in this paper we investigate the impact of incentives for improved 
organizational environmental performance by paying special attention to the observable 
variation in incentive design schemes across organizations, both in terms of the incentive 
beneficiaries and the forms that such incentives take. We conceptualize environmental 
performance incentives as organizational reward systems designed to stimulate and support 
employees’ knowledge-sharing routines, information absorption, and skills transmission 
(Katsikeas et al., 2016) designed to reduce firms’ physical impacts on the natural 
environment. Specifically, drawing on a large dataset of multinational enterprises we 
investigate the extent to which greater inclusiveness of incentive beneficiaries across different 
organizational levels and greater variety of incentive types help companies to reduce their 
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corporate carbon footprints, an area of environmental performance coming under increasing 
pressure from a range of stakeholders (Depoers et al., 2016; Howard-Grenville et al., 2014; 
Lee, 2012). By investigating the variety of existing incentive design schemes across 
organizations in which different actors receive incentives for improved environmental 
performance and distinguishing between financial and non-financial incentives, we 
characterize the possible configuration(s) of incentive beneficiaries and incentive types that 
arise in our sample, describe their empirical prevalence, and evaluate which configurations 
are linked to (the biggest) improvements in corporate environmental performance. 
In so doing, we make two main contributions to research on the impacts of 
environmental incentives on environmental outcomes. First, we contribute the most 
comprehensive and large scale empirical evidence on the impacts of environmental incentives 
to date. Our analysis is unique in its focus on understanding how both the variety of 
organizational beneficiaries whose activities are shaped by environmental incentives, and the 
forms that such incentives take, shape organizational outcomes. Our new evidence is a 
significant development of research on how intra-organizational processes and practices 
impact on firms’ non-financial performance metrics, such as reducing corporate GHG 
emissions (Ioannou et al., 2016; Maas, 2016; Parisi, 2013), and contributes substantially to 
normative advice regarding the relative effectiveness of alternative systems of environmental 
incentives. Given the growing salience of addressing global sustainability challenges, 
findings on the benefits of firms’ voluntary approaches to tackling their environmental 
impacts will help to guide practice in this arena. Second, we contribute conceptually to 
research on the impacts of organizational incentives on performance outcomes through the 
development of two principles of hierarchical incentive design, inclusiveness and variety, and 
the conceptualization of patterns of these in organizations as configurations of incentives. We 
argue that conceptualizing organizational incentives in this way reflects the complexity of 
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patterns of incentives present in most contemporary organizations and advances theorization 
of incentive impacts beyond prior research, which has tended to examine specific forms of 
incentives at the individual level in isolation from the wider patterns of incentives present 
elsewhere within organizations. Thus, our analysis pays greater attention to the 
interdependencies in beneficiaries and incentive types that are incumbent in particular 
configurations of incentives, and on how these affect performance outcomes. Such an 
understanding of the potential of incentives is critical, we argue, to informing how firms 
address complex problems such as sustainability (Angus-Leppan et al., 2010; Delmas and 
Blass, 2010; Hahn et al., 2010; Pinkse and Kolk, 2010), in the context of increasingly 
extended organizational hierarchies and designs (Groves, 1973; Hrebiniak, 2008; 
Mookherjee, 2006; Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 2001; Parisi, 2013). 
Conceptual Development and Hypotheses 
Understanding how firms define and achieve performance improvements has been of long-
standing interest to the management community as scholars and practitioners continue to 
grapple with the intricacies of measuring and motivating employees’ behavior. Research in 
corporate governance, organizational behavior and human resource management literatures 
have provided frameworks and arguments for explaining and predicting how managers 
respond to incentives for the achievement of specific targets and objectives in terms of future 
performance improvements. Our focus lies with the organizational-level phenomena of firms 
providing incentives to their employees specifically linked to the attainment of corporate 
GHG emissions reduction targets. We develop a model that conceptualizes how both the 
existence and inclusiveness of the beneficiaries of environmental performance incentives, and 
the variety of incentives types offered, shape corporate environmental performance. 
Additionally, we conceptualize how the possible combinatorial configurations of 
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environmental performance incentive beneficiaries and types influence changes in corporate 
GHG emissions (figure 1). Our analysis therefore addresses three related questions: First, 
how does the inclusiveness of the beneficiaries of environmental incentives within an 
organization influence subsequent changes in environmental performance? Second, how does 
the variety of incentive types for environmental performance present in an organization 
influence subsequent changes in environmental performance? Third, how do configurations 
of incentive beneficiaries and types combine to influence changes in corporate environmental 
performance? 
In the next section, we summarize extant literature relating to organizational 
incentives in the context of environmental performance, and specifically GHG emissions, 
before developing our hypotheses. 
 
<<<Figure 1 about here>>> 
 
Incentives and environmental improvements 
Derived from agency theory, organizational research on incentives generally argues that 
incentives encourage desired outcomes by influencing task prioritization and goal 
commitment (Knight et al., 2001; Locke and Latham, 1990), and by aligning the interests of 
individuals with those of the whole organization, i.e. its owners (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 
2009; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; Oyer, 2004; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Tosi et al., 
1997). Promising additional financial and/or non-financial benefits in return for the delivery 
of pre-specified outcomes, incentives are designed to encourage organizational actors to 
provide additional effort and achieve greater productivity (Cadsby et al., 2007; Stajkovic and 
Luthans, 2001). A well-established literature has investigated the efficacy of incentive pay on 
agents’ behavior in various organizational contexts by conducting experiments and secondary 
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data analyses. While agency-based compensation research by and large supports the notion 
that incentives may be useful for aligning the actions of agents with desired organizational 
outcomes (Baker et al., 1988; Cadsby et al., 2007; Gerhart et al., 2009; Gerhart and 
Milkovich, 1990; Knight et al., 2001; Stajkovic and Luthans, 2001; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 
1989; Wageman and Baker, 1997), the principle of incentive pay for executives faces 
growing criticism: first, on moral grounds because of fairness concerns about the hierarchical 
difference between executives and employees (Harris, 2009), and second, as a result of 
opposing research findings challenging their efficacy for improving firm financial 
performance (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Mishra et al., 2000). Harris (2008), for example, argues 
that executive incentive pay is linked to financial misrepresentation which has been shown to 
lead to substantial value destruction. Pay-for-performance has also been criticized as 
potentially leading to excessive risk-taking, extreme intra-firm competition, the ignoring of 
performance measures not explicitly targeted, and gaming or manipulation of performance 
measures covered (Gerhart and Fang, 2015).  
 Environmental performance has been studied widely both by sustainability and 
finance scholars (e.g., Kim and Lyon, 2011, 2015; Lee and Lounsbury, 2015; Misani and 
Pogutz, 2015; Reid and Toffel, 2009). This research follows in the wake of a growing number 
of companies that are voluntarily beginning to take specific actions in relation to reducing 
their greenhouse gas emissions as part of wider climate change strategies, which have been 
characterized along different corporate climate strategy profiles (Kolk and Pinkse, 2005; Lee, 
2012). For example, Weinhofer and Hoffmann (2010) found that while some utilities 
incorporate parallel emission management measures aimed at CO2 compensation, CO2 
reduction and carbon independence, others were more selective in their approaches. 
Generally, these strategic moves tend to be established in response to volatile energy costs, 
companies’ emissions profiles, regulatory exposure, competitive position, stakeholder 
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pressures, managerial and investor perceptions of the materiality of climate change, and the 
expectation of possible new policy measures at international and national levels designed to 
achieve global climate change ambitions (Busch and Hoffmann, 2007, 2011; Clarke and 
Crawford, 2012; Eccles et al., 2012; Guenther et al., 2012; Matisoff et al., 2013).  
It has also been recognized that organizational responses to climate change require 
firms to develop detailed corporate carbon strategies, complementary capabilities for 
incremental or more radical innovations, and coping mechanisms for managing uncertainty 
and trade-offs (Pinkse and Kolk, 2010; Lee, 2012). In this context, prior research recognizes 
the challenging and complex nature of reducing firms’ environmental footprints. For 
example, while some sustainability practices, such as eco-efficiency drives, might be “no 
brainers” (Salzmann et al., 2005, p.33), many others tend to be characterized by a need for 
significant up-front investment and highly uncertain returns and impacts (Marcus et al., 
2011). Firms therefore need to decide how to justify and manage potential negative short-
term versus positive long-term effects on financial performance from proactive climate 
change strategies, both for the benefit of their investors and their employees (Slawinski and 
Bansal, 2012; 2015; Slawinski et al., 2017; Delmas et al., 2015). Incentives may provide one 
means of overcoming the conflicting influence of a range of barriers in relation to achieving 
environmental outcomes (Norton et al., 2015). Consistent with the wider literature on the role 
of performance incentives, environmental performance incentives are argued to help reduce 
firms’ corporate greenhouse gas emissions by stimulating the search for and implementation 
of operational and behavioral changes through dedicated and additional efforts across an 
organization (Alt et al., 2015). Providing incentives as part of a proactive environmental 
strategy (e.g., Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; Delgado-Ceballos et al., 2012; Delmas and Toffel, 
2008) signals a long-term commitment to the specific outcome of environmental performance 
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improvement to all stakeholders (Jones, 1995), and thus legitimizes prioritization of decisions 
directly contributing to this goal. 
 
Inclusiveness of environmental incentives and environmental performance  
Having considered the effects of providing environmental performance incentives to reduce 
corporate carbon footprints, we now turn our attention to their particular implementation 
within organizations. We begin by examining the role and impact of different incentive 
beneficiaries across an organization to performance outcomes, given their potentially varied 
effects in circumstances requiring broad organizational collaboration and support. We define 
the inclusiveness of environmental incentives in an organization as the degree to which more, 
rather than fewer, levels of the organizational hierarchy face incentives for improved 
environmental performance. Specifically, the inclusiveness of a system of environmental 
incentives relates to how widespread environmental incentives are within an organization, 
and what range of organizational actors have their behavior potentially influenced by 
incentives. We propose that greater inclusiveness of incentive beneficiaries leads to greater 
alignment across different hierarchical levels that strengthen organizational decision-making 
and operational coordination processes.  
From a theoretical perspective, agency theory, or perhaps more appropriately ‘double-
agency theory’ (Child and Rodrigues 2003; Deutsch et al., 2010), suggests that incentives 
should not only apply to the key agents at the top of an organization, but to all levels within a 
given hierarchy to provide the greatest possible form of alignment with the interests of the 
principal. One counterargument to the possible benefits of greater inclusiveness of incentive 
beneficiaries comes from research highlighting the potentially distracting and distorting 
impacts caused by tournament effects and perceptions of status differentials that reduce 
efficient information processing and coordination of effort (Baker et al., 1988; Rubenfeld and 
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David, 2006; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Another key issue is whether organizational 
performance improvements can be attributed to the actions and behaviors of individual 
employees benefiting from incentives (Gerhart et al., 2009; Siemsen et al., 2007). For 
example, beyond the challenges of monitoring and enforcing agents’ behavior, employee 
incentive schemes across (particularly large) organizations are argued to lead to free-riding 
when employees can potentially share the rewards from improvements in joint output without 
necessarily having to make greater efforts themselves (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Wageman and Baker, 1997). Knez and Simester’s (2001) findings at Continental Airlines 
suggest that mutual monitoring among employees within work groups may help with 
mitigating such effects. Broadly speaking, however, greater inclusiveness of incentive 
beneficiaries across different hierarchical levels is argued to increase the likelihood of 
achieving specific goals that are consistent across the organization (Groves, 1973; 
Mookherjee, 2006; Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 2001; Wellbourne et al., 1995).  
This view acknowledges the role that all employees play in successfully affecting and 
executing the strategy formulated by top executives (Hrebiniak, 2008) and resonates with 
discussions in the ‘strategy-as-practice’ literature, which argue that particularly middle 
managers and frontline employees are embedded in micro-contexts that interact with wider 
macro-level influences (Godkin, 2015; Jarzabkowski, 2004). Consequently, employees’ 
responses to environmental challenges may be significantly shaped by factors outside the 
organization such as interactions with the local community (Rothenberg, 2003). This 
provides opportunities for adaptive practice, dialogue and learning. Particularly in pluralistic 
contexts such as climate change characterized by divergent goals, strategizing and organizing 
practices and processes within organizations requires approaches that draw on the 
multiplicity of knowledge and interactions from all employees (Jarzabkowski and Fenton, 
2006). In this case, including a wider range of incentive beneficiaries across the 
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organizational hierarchy creates a consistent and fair framework while providing sufficient 
flexibility for a multitude of potential responses.  
Turning to the specific case of firms’ GHG emissions, there is a recognition that 
performance improvements (i.e., emissions reductions) require significant efforts across a 
company’s different sites, processes, supply chains, product design teams and individual 
behaviors (Gulati et al., 2005; Russo and Harrison, 2005). Consequently, improving the 
distributed and plural nature and causes of corporate environmental performance can only be 
achieved through collaborative efforts and involvement of all employees (Gittell et al., 2010; 
Ramus and Steger, 2000; Siemsen et al., 2007), requiring efforts such as knowledge sharing, 
cross-functional innovation and other forms of team production (Bartol and Srivastava, 2002; 
Denton, 1999; Ramus, 2001). This argument acknowledges that a wide range of employee 
actions play a role in promoting sustainable outcomes (Ones and Dilchert, 2012). Reducing a 
firm’s carbon footprint necessitates behavioral changes among all employees as well as key 
decision taken by managers and executives with functional and strategic responsibility. As a 
result, incentives are unlikely to achieve their intended outcomes unless they are applied 
broadly by including the goals and efforts of all those both directly and indirectly affected by 
the decision-making and innovation processes (Baker, 1988; Wageman and Baker, 1997). 
Incentive inclusiveness then relates to the broadening of the number of beneficiaries at 
different levels within the corporate hierarchy by coherently incentivizing the reduction of 
corporate GHG emissions through greater task interdependence and team production 
(Kathuria et al., 2007; Parisi, 2013). We therefore hypothesize that the more firms provide 
incentives to a wider, more inclusive set of beneficiaries, the more likely they are to witness 
environmental performance improvements: 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firms with more inclusive environmental performance incentives 
will exhibit greater improvements in corporate environmental performance than firms 
with less inclusive environmental performance incentives. 
 
Variety of environmental incentives and environmental performance  
Having considered the inclusiveness of environmental performance incentives, in the next 
step we examine how the variety of types of incentives offered has any bearing on 
environmental performance improvement. Specifically, we distinguish between monetary and 
non-monetary incentives and argue that employees’ underlying motivations, and the way in 
which these are incentivized and rewarded, are likely to affect organizational outcomes.  
Existing research on environmental performance incentives is concerned with rewards 
in return for specified pro-environmental outcomes (e.g., Ioannou et al., 2016; Kolk and 
Perego, 2014; Maas, 2016; Maas and Rosendaal, 2016; Rodrigue et al., 2013; Russo and 
Harrison 2005; Theyel, 2000) which tend to be designed either around executive 
remuneration (e.g., bonus payments, stock options, etc.) or increasingly innovative 
managerial and employee incentive schemes (e.g., recognition awards, pay raises, 
promotions, rewards, prizes, position performance appraisals, tax exemptions, access to low-
carbon corporate car fleet, paid vacations, time off, gift certificates, opportunities to attend 
sustainability events/rallies, daily praise) (Renwick et al., 2013). The literature around the 
effects of environmental reward and incentive schemes and environmental performance has 
been repeatedly summarized in various reviews (Bashford, 2008; Fernandez et al. 2003; 
Renwick et al., 2014) but to date provides predominantly empirical evidence at the executive 
level. Here, Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) showed that long-term pay has a positive and 
highly significant impact on subsequent pollution prevention performance and is greater for 
firms operating in the highest-pollution sectors. Meanwhile, Kock et al. (2012) found that 
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firms providing greater market-based compensation to their CEOs show a superior level of 
environmental performance. They argue that equity-based incentives geared towards 
maximizing long-term value create these effects by aligning managers’ interests closer to 
those of stakeholders and by providing stakeholders with a greater ability to enforce their 
environmental preferences through activism, for example, through media reporting of 
environmental news. Rodrigue et al. (2013) also identified environmental incentives in 
executive compensation as having some positive impact on subsequent pollution prevention 
performance. Studying the inverse relationship, Cordeiro and Sarkis (2008) showed that CEO 
compensation is only affected by corporate environmental performance in firms with an 
explicit linkage between environmental performance and executive contracts. Ioannou et al.  
(2016) found that in the context of achieving carbon emission reduction projects, the 
provision of monetary incentives to top and middle managers may undermine the positive 
effect of target difficulty on performance. Below the upper echelons, research into the 
effectiveness of financial incentives is mainly concerned with establishing their existence 
(Theyel, 2000). Russo and Harrison’s (2005) research remains the most prominent exception, 
finding a link between plant manager compensation and reduced emissions, and arguing that 
“incentives help shifting managerial attention to environmental issues” (p.590). Yet Katsikeas 
et al.’s (2016) survey with UK senior managers could not find a significant impact of 
environmental performance incentives on eco-friendly product development strategies. 
In terms of non-financial performance incentives, the human resource management 
literature, both academic and non-academic, has written extensively about the characteristics, 
advantages and disadvantages of employing such schemes (e.g., Luthans and Stajkovic, 1999; 
McKinsey, 2009; Monitor, 2014), highlighting in particular the importance of strong 
employee-supervisor relationships: “It is ironic, that many non-financial recognition schemes 
are often simply concerned with attempting to remind managers that there are things they 
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should be doing as part of good management practice anyway, regardless of any scheme” 
(IES, 2004, p.14). Yet benefits of employing non-financial performance incentives include 
encouraging strategic behaviors; cost efficiency; immediacy of impact; employer branding; 
retention; and high street credibility. Disadvantages meanwhile may pertain to the value of 
the scheme; the need for a credible assessment process; cultural fit; tax and small print; 
fraudulent nominations; maintaining momentum; and potentially negative impacts from 
wider economic conditions (IES, 2004). 
Regarding the effects of non-monetary environmental performance incentives extant 
literature focuses on their existence and the identification of the multitude of forms they 
exhibit (Renwick et al., 2013). Non-financial incentives also tend to be covered as part of a 
wider debate on the elements of proactive environmental management strategies in general 
(Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; Delgado-Ceballos et al., 2012; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Lucas, 
2010). Research insights again suggest that key to the effectiveness of these schemes is the 
degree to which they are widely supported by the organization, and whether they encourage 
communications across different levels within the organizational hierarchy and stimulate 
innovation, creativity and learning (Ramus, 2001; Ramus and Steger, 2000; Temminck et al., 
2015).  
Theoretically, research on incentives is heavily underpinned by insights into the role 
played by individual motivations for engaging in specific activities and making extra effort 
available. Important in this context is the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations whereby “[i]ntrinsic motivation is the motivation to do something for its own 
sake, for the sheer enjoyment of a task. Extrinsic motivation is the motivation to do 
something in order to attain some external goal or meet some externally imposed constraint” 
(Hennessey et al., 2015, p.1). Prior literature, for example, has distinguished between 
“required” or “task-based” sustainability behaviors (Norton et al., 2015; Bissing-Olson et al., 
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2012), such as complying with organizational policies, changing work practices to select 
more sustainable alternatives, and creating sustainable products, services, and processes, and 
“voluntary” aspects of employee sustainability behavior, such as prioritizing environmental 
interests, initiating environmental programs and policies, lobbying and activism, and 
encouraging others to behave more sustainably. One important question is whether the 
attainment of corporate carbon targets can be achieved through “voluntary” aspects of 
employee behavior only, or whether they necessitate corporate demands for “required” 
behaviors as well. 
In this context, research on motivating “pro-social” (doing good) employee behavior 
suggests that monetary incentives (i.e. extrinsic rewards) are more likely to be 
counterproductive because they crowd out individuals’ desire to create a positive image 
among their peers (Ariely et al., 2007; Gneezy et al., 2011). Particularly when behaviors and 
rewards are made public, monetary incentives can undermine the effectiveness of employees’ 
intrinsic motivations to be seen as doing something good, e.g., reducing carbon emissions. 
For example, investigations into pro-environmental behaviors suggest that employees’ 
attitude towards food waste or pollution prevention depend on their intrinsic (even altruistic 
and private) motivations (Cecere et al., 2014) as well as their attitudes, knowledge, beliefs 
and other preferences (Cordano and Frieze, 2000; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). Findings 
from a literature review on pro-environmental behavior in the workplace therefore 
corroborate the mostly significant effects of non-monetary incentives (Inoue and Alfaro-
Barrantes, 2015). 
By contrast, decoupling organizational growth from underlying carbon emissions in 
almost all industries requires major strategic adjustments (Howard-Grenville et al., 2014; 
Slawinski and Bansal, 2012; 2015) that will unlikely be achieved by relying on employees’ 
voluntary commitments only. There is therefore a strong need to institutionalize “required” or 
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“task-based” sustainability behaviors if the organization is serious about its carbon target 
commitments (Ioannou et al., 2016; Maas, 2016; Maas and Rosendaal, 2016). Moreover, not 
all individuals may be intrinsically motivated to be pro-environmental, particularly when 
there might be countervailing pressures and imperatives, or a lack of supervisory support 
(Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002; Ramus and Steger, 2000). Given that in many companies 
environmental salience remains generally lower than other core functional objectives (Gabel 
and Desgagné, 1993), achieving environmental progress requires people to change how they 
do things and “go the extra mile” (Lothe et al., 1999; Ramus, 2001). It is for these reasons 
that monetary incentives are more likely to increase the general strategic salience of 
achieving carbon targets, create organizational cultures and conditions conducive to 
overcoming organizational barriers, and encourage extrinsically motivated types of 
behaviors.  
We therefore argue that the best outcomes are more likely to be expected in 
organizational contexts characterized by a wider provision of a variety of incentive types. In 
other words, while both monetary and non-monetary incentives are likely to affect 
organizational outcomes separately, firms providing both types of incentives should 
additively benefit from the biggest performance effects (Peterson and Luthans, 2006). As in 
H1, we argue that the challenges involved in reducing corporate carbon footprints require a 
wide range of actors and activities and so we would expect that both financial and non-
financial incentive types are needed to promote pro-environmental behaviors from employees 
that are motivated by either extrinsic or intrinsic motivations (Ramus, 2001). In that sense, by 
offering a variety of complementary incentive types firms account for the multitude of task 
environments within which significant individual decisions need to be made. 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firms with more varied environmental incentives will exhibit greater 
improvements in corporate environmental performance than firms with less varied 
environmental incentives 
 
Configurations of environmental incentives and environmental performance 
Finally, having considered the respective benefits of incentive beneficiaries and incentive 
types, we turn our attention to the question of which combination(s) of these elements most 
likely have the biggest impacts. To that end, we consider the possibility of firms configuring 
specific combinations of incentive beneficiaries and incentive types, characterize differences 
and similarities in their approaches, and hypothesize their respective effectiveness. Given our 
hypotheses 1 and 2, the most logical extension is a configuration characterized by the greatest 
possible degree of inclusiveness in terms of incentive beneficiaries and the presence of the 
biggest variety of incentive types. Yet while greater inclusion of incentive beneficiaries and a 
greater variety of incentive types may be conceptually superior when treated in isolation, it is 
also important to recognize potential trade-offs when both elements are considered 
simultaneously.  
For example, in the case of specifying inter-hierarchical incentives, mixing monetary 
and non-monetary incentives across different beneficiaries may create perceptions of 
unfairness and incoherence (Harris, 2009) and can lead to incentive conflict and other 
undesired effects on behavior (Gneezy et al., 2011; Gulati et al., 2005). There may thus be a 
need for incentive alignment (Tosi et al., 1997) and the strengthening of reward 
interdependence across different beneficiaries in a manner that is not perceived as symbolic 
(Wageman and Baker, 1997). For instance, it should not matter whether all beneficiaries are 
being offered monetary incentives, non-monetary incentives, or both, provided the same type 
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of incentive applies to all hierarchies. Doing so would ensure that the incentive scheme is 
both inclusive and consistent.  
A key counterargument, however, is that people in different hierarchical positions 
may be motivated differently, e.g., executives may be driven more by extrinsic motivations 
and rewards to achieve carbon reduction targets, than perhaps employees at lower levels, who 
might perceive of pro-environmental behaviors as intrinsically worth doing and where thus 
non-financial rewards may be more appropriate. This is effectively an argument for ensuring 
incentive types offered fit the respective underlying motivations of employees at different 
organizational levels and in different task environments without necessarily crowding out 
particularly intrinsic motivations (Baker et al., 1988; Ariely et al., 2007; Gneezy et al., 2011; 
IES, 2004). Given our assertion that addressing corporate carbon targets entails significantly 
challenging and complex strategic adjustments that cannot simply be addressed through 
voluntary extra-efforts, we argue that some degree of inconsistency from providing intrinsic, 
non-monetary rewards while offering extrinsic, monetary rewards to other beneficiaries, will 
be unavoidable, and indeed necessary. Firms that include incentives for the broadest number 
of beneficiaries, and do so by offering a wide choice of incentive types to each and all of 
these beneficiaries, should theoretically see the biggest benefits in terms of environmental 
performance improvements. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Firms with greater inclusiveness of environmental incentive beneficiaries 
and with a greater variety in terms of the types of incentives offered to these beneficiaries will 
exhibit the biggest improvements in corporate environmental performance. 
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Methods 
Sample 
For our sample we draw on data provided by the CDP, formerly known as the Carbon 
Disclosure Project. The CDP initiative, led by a consortium of over 822 institutional investors 
with cumulatively over US$95 trillion of assets under investment, seeks improvements into 
the transparency and management of environmental issues through the largest collection 
globally of self-reported climate change, water and forest-risk data among leading global 
companies (CDP, 2015). Since 2002 the CDP has invited the largest companies in the world 
to provide data and details through its annual survey on companies’ greenhouse gas 
emissions, climate change risks and opportunities, and management strategies in relation to 
environmental performance. By providing summary reports of firms’ responses to the 
questionnaire on the CDP website the initiative is seeking to drive transparency and 
disclosure in relation to environmental management and performance with the aim to shape 
investor and buyer decision-making. Despite the voluntary nature of the CDP’s annual survey 
the levels of participation (by both firms and institutional investors), information disclosure, 
and the depth of information requested by the CDP have all grown substantially over time. In 
2014, the latest year for which data were available to us, 82% of the FT Global 500, the 
largest companies by market capitalization included in the FTSE Global Equity Index Series, 
participated in the CDP, and in total over 4,500 companies from around 50 different countries 
disclosed detailed information regarding their environmental management and performance. 
As a result, CDP data are increasingly gathering attention in existing research. 
Examples include studies aimed at determining the effect of shareholder resolutions and other 
stakeholder pressures on firms responding to the CDP survey in the first place (and thus 
disclosing corporate GHG emission levels) (Guenther et al., 2012; Reid and Toffel, 2009), 
examinations of the development of the CDP reporting mechanism from governance and 
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standardization perspectives (Kolk et al., 2008; Matisoff et al., 2013), analyses of 
multinational corporations’ political strategies with respect to climate change (Kolk and 
Pinkse, 2007, 2008), a study on the relationship between firms’ carbon intensity and financial 
performance (Misani and Pogutz, 2015) and assessments of stock market reactions to 
disclosing climate change strategies (Kim and Lyon, 2011). Other studies use the CDP data to 
classify different types of greenhouse gas emissions strategies on the basis of cluster analyses 
(Kolk and Pinkse, 2005; Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 2010). 
We sample from the overall CDP data by including a total of 3,117 firm-year 
observations between 2011 and 2014. Our sample is restricted by the following 
considerations. First, we concentrate our attention on those companies that have actively 
provided information in their survey response about the presence or absence of climate 
change incentives within their firms. We do so first because not all survey respondent firms 
disclose information at this level of detail; many that do provide this information, however, 
are willing to admit they do not have incentives in place. By choosing this sampling frame we 
seek to ensure that only active disclosure of incentive information is included in our sample 
rather than indirectly inferred. Second, 2011 survey data provide the first set of responses that 
include incentive data in a format which has since then remained consistent. This provides 
some assurance that a more standardized definition of emissions incentives has been applied. 
It also enables us to test the impact of incentive presence on subsequent emissions 
performance. We marry this sample of incentives data with CDP data on corporate GHG 
emissions as well as with financial control data from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
 
Dependent Variable and Modelling Approach 
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Measurement of firms’ carbon footprints is a complex and information-intensive process 
characterized by the presence of multiple approaches and competing evaluation 
methodologies. A primary distinction is made in most research on firms’ greenhouse gas 
emissions between direct (or “Scope 1” emissions) and indirect emissions (or “Scope 2” 
emissions). Direct emissions stem from activities immediately controlled or owned by the 
reporting firm (for example, from on-site production processes, direct use of fossil fuels in 
boilers and furnaces, and in-house power generation), and indirect emissions arise from the 
firms’ use of purchased energy, normally electricity. A third category of emissions (Scope 3 
emissions) encompasses emissions deriving chiefly from a firm’s supply chain (i.e. carbon 
and other greenhouse gases embodied in procured goods and services), from business travel, 
and that associated with external distribution (WBSCD/WRI, 2011). Since Scope 3 emissions 
are harder to evaluate and measure accurately, and because their disclosure is non-mandatory 
within the CDP, these data are more patchy and less reliable (Huang et al., 2009). Therefore, 
consistent with earlier studies that have drawn upon CDP data, we use the total sum of scope 
1 and scope 2 emissions to capture a firm’s carbon footprint in a given year.  
In common with many studies of corporate environmental performance, we calculate 
the annual percentage of change in firms’ absolute GHG emissions for our measure of 
corporate environmental performance. We focus on an absolute rather than intensity based 
measure because in our international sample this would, for example, require the inclusion of 
financial performance metrics such as turnover or profits which are typically accounted for in 
national currencies. To complete intensity calculations, we would need to incorporate 
exchange rate data, but given their fluctuation over time this would introduce variability not 
caused by the underlying core data but by varying exchange rates. Alternative suggestions for 
intensity-based measures include using operational factors, such as forms of output (e.g., 
kWh, revenue-passenger-kilometers, or square meters) and number of employees. Given the 
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large variety of industries covered in our sample, however, such sector-specific or at least 
sector-biased approaches towards measuring performance on an intensity basis are highly 
skewed making comparison unreliable. Finally, we also argue that climate change is in the 
end a global problem whereby the eventual climatic pathways will be driven by total absolute 
emissions added to the atmosphere over time. Therefore, for firms to make substantial 
performance improvements in the context of climate change their emissions need to decouple 
from operational growth and thus decline in absolute terms (Figge et al., 2014; Slawinski et 
al., 2017; Young and Tilley, 2006). 
We also focus on the percentage improvement in firms’ GHG emissions, rather than a 
comparison of levels, to help strengthening the causal logic of our modelling and to 
overcome sample selection issues. Sample selection issues are endemic in studies of 
environmental reporting, performance, and disclosure because firm characteristics (including 
size, industry and, most importantly, prior environmental footprint) shape firms’ decisions to 
participate in environmental initiatives as well as their performance in relation to 
environmental pollutants. Prior research has demonstrated that typically the best (in the sense 
of least environmentally impactful) and worst (in the sense of most environmentally 
impactful) firms are more prone to engage with environmental issues since these companies 
have either good news to celebrate or legitimacy concerns to address. These selection effects 
mean that associations between the levels of firms’ environmental impacts and characteristics 
that are at least somewhat stable over time are biased and potentially misleading. For 
example, one might identify a strong positive association between the presence of 
environmental incentives and the level of firms’ emissions (and even their subsequent 
emissions); this seems somewhat paradoxical until one controls for the greater tendency for 
firms with larger emissions to allocate specific responsibility to overseeing the firms’ 
improvements in this arena (Russo and Harrison, 2005). Evaluating the influences on the 
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changes in firms’ environmental performance is one way of eliminating possible selection 
effects. To further strengthening the causal inferences we make, we introduce a one year lag 
into our model – so, for example, percentage emissions changes over the period 2011-2012 
are assumed to relate to a firm’s presence of emissions incentives reported in 2011.  
Due to the presence of a number of outliers, we Winsorize our dependent variable (the 
% change in firms’ total GHG emissions) at the top and bottom 5% (Le and O’Brien, 2010). 
Rather than eliminating significant outliers Winsorizing involves the substitution of the 
values for the largest and smallest 5% of the sample (in terms of environmental performance) 
with the value of the last observation at the 95th % and 5th % limits, respectively. This process 
thus has the benefit of retaining the complete set of sample data and removing the effects of 
potentially distractive outliers. The downside to the process is that it somewhat mutes the 
effects of very large and small observations in subsequent analyses and also introduces new 
data that are themselves derived from the sample, thus introducing a degree of circularity into 
the dataset. For the purposes of this research, however, we are satisfied that this process 
provides an adequate way to overcome the distortion of extreme values.   
 
Independent Variables 
One fascinating aspect of the annual CDP research stems from the survey’s exploration of 
how firms manage, strategize, organize, and incentivize their climate change efforts. 
Consequently, we draw on a key section of the CDP questionnaire to investigate whether 
climate change incentives effectively improve environmental performance or not. We use 
these data to construct a series of dichotomous variables that capture significant aspects of the 
presence of incentives across firm-year observations. We begin with firms that have 
implemented any kind of incentive for climate change management including the attainment 
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of emissions reduction targets; these are coded one for the incentive implementation, and zero 
otherwise (Any Incentive).  
Incentive Inclusiveness. Furthermore, the CDP survey asks respondents to disclose 
the beneficiary of their firms’ incentives. These beneficiaries are pre-coded into a series of 16 
groups of beneficiaries plus an open-ended category for “other”. We summarize these data by 
recoding them into a series of binary variables by differentiating between incentives for the 
top team; for middle management; and for all employees. Since companies can provide 
incentives to more than one level at the same time, we develop seven dichotomous variables 
designed to accurately classify the degree of inclusiveness of incentive beneficiaries at the 
firm-year level. These mutually-exclusive variables illustrate the increasing inclusiveness of 
beneficiaries provided with incentives across the sample (TopLevelOnly; MiddleLevelOnly; 
AllEmployeesOnly; TopAndMiddle; TopAndAllEmployees; MiddleAndAllEmployees; and 
All3Levels). For example, the variable All3Levels accounts for firms providing environmental 
performance incentives to all levels within the corporate hierarchy. For each variable, 1 
indicates the presence of incentives for the named category of beneficiaries, and 0 its 
absence. 
Incentive Type. In addition to the incentive beneficiary, CDP respondents are also 
asked to provide information on the type of incentive offered. These responses again come in 
three original forms plus an “other” category. We simplify these responses by re-recoding 
them into monetary and non-monetary incentives. To account for the possibility of firms 
offering both or either types of incentives, we create three mutually-exclusive binary 
variables of incentive types (MonetaryOnly; NonMonetaryOnly; BothTypes). 
Combinatorial configurations. Recognizing that firms employ a variety of incentive 
schemes, we calculate a further set of binary variables which accurately assign a particular 
configuration of incentive beneficiaries and incentive types to every firm year. In other 
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words, we seek to classify every firm by one mutually-exclusive configuration which 
uniquely describes the complete incentive scheme it operates. To achieve this, we create 
binary variables for the 63 possible combinatorial configurations, each taking the value of 1 
where this configuration applies and 0 where it does not (see details below).  
 
Control Variables 
In addition to our variables of interest, we control for a number of firm characteristics that 
have been hypothesized to influence firm environmental responsiveness (Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Cordeiro and Sarkis, 2008; Delmas et al., 2015). These include country 
(captured here through the inclusion of a series of country fixed effects variables); industry 
sector (captured through the inclusion of a series of 2-digit SIC fixed effects variables); year 
(captured through the inclusion of a series of year fixed effects variables); firm size (captured 
by the natural logarithm of the number of employees); prior financial performance ROTA 
(captured by the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets); leverage (captured by the ratio of total 
debt to total assets); and R&D intensity (captured by the ratio of R&D expenses to total 
assets). To assess whether our sample suffers from problems related to multi-collinearity we 
calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable as part of our analysis. We 
found that no variable had a VIF greater than 3.3, which is below the threshold of 10 
suggested as indicative of multi-collinearity problems (Belsley et al., 1980). Tables 1 and 2, 
below, provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of our sample and a correlation 
matrix.  
 
<<<Tables 1 and 2 about here>>> 
 
27 
 
From visual inspection it becomes obvious that the seven variations of incentive beneficiaries 
are roughly equally distributed across the sample in terms of their frequencies, and that most 
firms either rely on monetary incentives only or on a combination of monetary and non-
monetary incentives. Finally, not all of the 63 possible configurations are represented in our 
sample; the combinations “Top and Middle only – Money only” (n=274) and “Middle only – 
Money only” (n=260) are the two most widely employed configurations of incentive 
beneficiaries and types. By contrast, the combination “All3Levels – Both”, i.e. a 
configuration whereby all three levels within the corporate hierarchy are provided with both 
monetary and non-monetary incentives is present only in 14 firm-years. 
 
Model Estimation 
Tests of our hypotheses 1-3 were conducted using OLS regression based on the model in 
Expression (1), whereby we first began with a base model which only includes control 
variables (model 1) (table 3), then a non-hypothesized regression testing the general 
effectiveness of incentives (AnyIncentive) (model 2), followed by two separate successive 
regressions that include different forms of incentive inclusiveness TopLevelOnly; 
MiddleLevelOnly; AllEmployeesOnly; TopAndMiddle; TopAndAllEmployees; 
MiddleAndAllEmployees; and All3Levels (model 3); and incentive types MonetaryOnly; 
NonMonetaryOnly; BothTypes (model 4). Next, model 5 (table 4) first combines all forms of 
incentive inclusiveness and types, before we add all 63 possible combinatorial configurations 
(model 6). Finally, model 7 only includes the ten statistically significant combinatorial 
configurations identified from results in model 6 (details in the next section). 
(I) Change in environmental performance = b0 + b1(Incentive specifications) + 
b2(Firm Size) + b3(R&D Intensity) + b4(Leverage) + b5(ROTA) + b6(Country) + 
b7(Industry) + b8(Year) + error 
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Findings 
In the following section we describe the results of our regression analyses as detailed in 
tables 3 and 4 below. Model 1 illustrates our base model which includes industry, country 
and year fixed effects as well as our four financial control variables. It suggests that firms 
with greater returns on assets (ROTA) are significantly, though only marginally, associated 
with increases in subsequent corporate GHG emissions, reflecting the difficulties of 
decoupling economic growth from environmental performance. We then introduce an 
independent variable, the presence of incentives for corporate GHG emissions reductions 
(model 2) and find that firms with incentives in place are weakly associated with reductions 
in emissions, though this effect appears not be statistically significant. 
 Next, we turn our attention to the inclusiveness of incentives provided across 
organizational hierarchies. To do so we enter seven independent binary variables 
characterizing the presence of incentives for different beneficiaries and combinations thereof 
within the organization (model 3). The results suggest that almost all incentives offered to 
different levels and combinations within the corporate hierarchy are broadly negatively 
associated with subsequent GHG emissions changes, but only when incentives are provided 
to all beneficiaries in the organization do these negative effects become significant (p<0.05). 
Moreover, the negative coefficient for the independent variable distinguishing between firms 
with incentives for all hierarchical levels and those without any incentives (-2.665) is the 
largest of all the seven possible forms of inclusiveness, and larger also than the negative 
coefficient for the general incentive effect only (-0.75). These findings therefore lend support 
to our first hypothesis (H1) predicting that greater inclusiveness in environmental 
performance incentives, that is, a larger number of hierarchical levels incentivized, affects 
improvements in environmental performance.  
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 In the next step, we differentiate our analysis by including only the type of incentive 
offered as our independent variables (model 4). Results again suggest that all three possible 
forms of incentive type are associated with reductions in GHG emissions, but that only broad 
inclusiveness, i.e. the simultaneous provision, of both monetary and non-monetary incentives 
yields the biggest and significant improvements in environmental performance (p<0.05). This 
lends support to our second hypothesis (H2) arguing that firms offering a broader variety of 
incentive types are associated with improvements in environmental performance. 
 
<<<Table 3 about here>>> 
 
 Finally, we investigate the extent to which specific configurations combining both 
incentive beneficiaries and incentive types affect environmental performance. To do so, we 
first calculate a model which includes all previous seven forms of incentive beneficiaries plus 
the three variations of incentive types. Combining these independent variables we find that 
none of them are statistically significant (model 5). In other words, the simultaneous, but 
disaggregated analysis of incentive inclusiveness and variety leads to effects that appear to 
cancel each other out. We therefore decide to drill deeper into the combinations and effects of 
incentive beneficiaries and types. 
To do so, we enter all 63 mutually-exclusive incentive configurations to this model. 
For the sake of clarity, we report only the results from incentive configurations that are 
statistically significant (model 6) finding ten such configurations are associated with 
reductions in GHG emissions. We also observe r-square increasing from 0.085 (model 5) to 
0.101 (model 6), suggesting an increase in explanatory power of our model 6 with all 
incentive configurations included, yet as the F-test results indicate, this change in r-square 
between models 5 and 6 is not statistically significant.  
30 
 
We therefore re-run a similar model 7 as a robustness test; this time, however, we 
include only the ten configurations that were identified in model 6 as being significant (rather 
than all possible 63 permutations). Results are largely identical in direction and strength, even 
if slightly less, or in two cases no longer (“TopMoneyMiddleNonMoney” and 
“MiddleMoneyAllEmplBoth”), statistically significant. Crucially, however, comparing our 
models 5 and 7, we still observe an increase in r-square from 0.085 to 0.094 and a statistically 
significant F change (2.856; p=0.002). This lends strength to our third hypothesis arguing that 
understanding configurations of incentive inclusiveness and type is important in the context 
of environmental performance improvements. The ten significant combinations of incentive 
configurations identified in model 6 are, sorted alphabetically:  
 “All Employees Only – Both”  (-13.550; p<0.01) (n=120) 
 “All Employees Only – Money Only” (-10.386; p<0.01) (n=200) 
 “All Employees Only – Non Money Only” (-13.946; p<0.01) (n=144) 
 “Middle – Both, All Employees – Non Money” (-20.529; p<0.05) (n=17) 
 “Middle – Money, All Employees – Both” (-14.666; p<0.01) (n=24) 
 “Middle – Non Money, All Employees – Money” (-21.568; p<0.05) (n=8) 
 “Middle Only – Non Money Only” (-11.843; p<0.05) (n=64) 
 “Top – Money, Middle – Non Money” (-14.295; p<0.01) (n=11) 
 “Top – Non Money, Middle – Money” (-20.591; p<0.01) (n=19) 
 “Top And Middle Only – Non Money Only” (-16.198; p<0.05) (n=21) 
 
Based on the prevalence of different configurations of incentive beneficiaries and types 
across these results listed above, we broadly identify four patterns: First, a group of incentive 
configurations designed for all employees within the organization, whereby incentive types 
can be financial, non-financial, or both. In all three cases, however, the types are consistently 
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the same for all employees within the organization. In the second group, we find incentives 
provided to middle management in combination with all employees. Here the types of 
incentives vary displaying heterogeneity with regard to financial and non-financial rewards. 
A third, single configuration provides only middle management with non-financial rewards. 
Finally, the fourth configurational group provides incentives to both top and middle 
management levels in the organizational hierarchy. Again we find interesting variation in 
terms of incentive types with only the last configuration providing consistently non-financial 
rewards to both hierarchical levels. We discuss the implications of our results in the next 
section. 
 
<<<Table 4 about here>>> 
Discussion 
In this paper, we investigated the role that organizational incentive schemes play in 
improving corporate environmental performance. Drawing on a large dataset of multinational 
enterprises we explored the extent to which incentives help companies with reducing their 
corporate carbon footprints, an area of environmental performance facing significant 
attention (Howard-Grenville et al., 2014). Specifically, we explored whether inclusiveness of 
incentive beneficiaries at different organizational levels and variety of incentive types play a 
role in terms of their effects on promoting organizational outcomes. 
 Empirically, our results provide support for our hypotheses, suggesting that greater 
inclusiveness of incentive beneficiaries and offering a greater variety of incentive types are 
associated with significant environmental performance improvements. Particularly firms that 
include a wide range of incentive beneficiaries from different hierarchical levels, and those 
that include both monetary and non-monetary incentive types, witness subsequent short-term 
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reductions in GHG emissions. Further combining these analyses by studying the 
combinatorial effects of unique configurations, we find that ten specific incentive schemes 
are associated with significant improvements in environmental performance. All of these ten 
configurations include at least two beneficiaries from different levels in the corporate 
hierarchy within their schemes underlining the importance of inter-hierarchical inclusiveness. 
This is achieved by providing incentives either to all employees, or to two distinct 
hierarchical levels. We also find that incentives specifically for middle managers are central 
to seven of these configurations confirming the pivotal, boundary-spanning role (Rothenberg, 
2003; 2007) these managers play in transmitting and responding to corporate carbon targets. 
Finally, our third hypothesis stressed the need for inclusiveness and variety in 
incentive arrangements. We find that five of the ten significant configurations mix and match 
both financial and non-financial incentives across at least two different levels of beneficiaries 
included, thus lending support to our hypothesis 3. This suggests that concerns about 
unfairness and incoherence (Harris, 2009), incentive conflict and other undesired effects on 
behavior (Gneezy et al., 2011; Gulati et al., 2005) appear to be unfounded in this context; 
rather our results appear to strengthen arguments for ensuring incentive types offered fit a 
variety of underlying motivations and contexts at different organizational levels (Ariely et al., 
2007; Baker et al., 1988; Gerhart et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2011; IES, 2004). This is 
particularly supported by the fact that non-monetary incentives implicitly appear to play an 
important role in nine of these configurations, thus providing support for the need to 
recognize and reward intrinsic motivations as well. Three combinations also offer both types 
of incentives to their beneficiaries simultaneously suggesting that crowding out effects may 
not necessarily be a concern when it comes to stimulating the search for ways to reduce 
corporate carbon emissions. As such, our findings encourage practitioners tasked with 
improving their firms’ environmental performance to go beyond mechanistic, organizational 
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processes such as environmental management systems and implement far-reaching incentive 
systems that encourage all employees to search for and execute more environmentally-
sensitive operational models. 
Theoretically, our research also contributes to recent reflections on the value of a 
‘double-agency theory’ (Child and Rodrigues 2003; Deutsch et al., 2010) suggesting that 
incentives should not only apply to the key agents at the top of an organization, but 
essentially to all levels within the corporate hierarchy to provide the greatest possible form of 
alignment with the interests of the principal. In our case, there is thus an implicit assumption 
that executives implement and disseminate incentives across the organization because firstly 
they believe in the importance of reducing GHG emissions, ultimately to the benefit of the 
owners/principal. Secondly, this view also acknowledges the role that all employees play in 
successfully executing the strategy formulated by top executives (Hrebiniak, 2008; 
Temminck et al., 2015) and therefore that rewards for the achievement of specific goals need 
to include all levels within the corporate hierarchy to be successful (Groves, 1973; 
Mookherjee, 2006; Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 2001). Particularly when faced with 
complex organizational challenges such as reducing corporate carbon footprints, our findings 
add to the literature emphasizing the need for knowledge sharing, collaboration and other 
forms of team production among all employees (Bartol and Srivastava, 2002; Denton, 1999; 
Gittell et al., 2010; Ramus and Steger, 2000; Ramus, 2001; Siemsen et al., 2007). Greater 
inclusiveness of incentive beneficiaries provided to all levels within the corporate hierarchy 
therefore sends a powerful signal that efforts need to be made across the entire organization 
and that they cannot merely be imposed “top-down” or compartmentalized in special 
organizational functions. 
In our analyses, we were interested in the positive effects of incentives and as such we 
only found results in support of our hypothesized effects in terms of environmental 
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performance improvements. None of the results showed statistically significant increases in 
emissions following specific incentive configurations suggesting that incentives generally 
work. Our data, however, did not allow us to examine any potential side-effects caused by the 
presence of incentives, for example, whether they increased internal rivalry or led to the 
neglect of other performance measures. We also focused our studies on the effects of 
corporate carbon footprints and therefore cannot assess whether other forms of environmental 
performance improvement might not be better served by other managerial practices (cf., 
Katsikeas et al., 2016). In that sense, our research was shaped by the overall complexity 
involved in decarbonizing organizational processes and the role that effective team 
production and individual motivations play. Our research was also naturally limited by data 
availability and selection bias inherent in the voluntary nature of the data collection process 
and the slowly-emerging standardization. At the same, this particular data source enabled us 
to test specific hypotheses regarding the efficacy of incentives across an organization, data 
which otherwise tend to be difficult to be obtained. Our hope is that with growing plans to 
make non-financial data reporting mandatary more and better data will become available and 
assist in retesting our hypotheses. Finally, owing to the slowly growing data availability our 
measurement of firm environmental performance was significantly limited to short-term, i.e. 
one-year, impacts. In order to ascertain longevity of the effects identified in our research 
future studies would benefit from investigating their persistency in medium-term time frames. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we explored the role that managerial incentives play in improving corporate 
environmental performance finding that greater inclusiveness of incentive beneficiaries and 
greater variety incentive types are important factors in firms’ incentive schemes. Drawing on 
a large dataset of multinational enterprises our results suggest that generally including more 
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beneficiaries from different levels within the corporate hierarchy and offering both monetary 
and non-monetary rewards are more likely to lead to reductions in corporate greenhouse gas 
emissions. Our findings thus pave the way for future research delving deeper into firms’ 
underlying motivations and justifications for specific incentive configurations. They also call 
for a better understanding of how exactly incentives interact with beneficiaries at different 
levels, taking into account their respective types. Are there differences depending on 
industry, country or type of firm ownership? What actual behaviors and actions do incentives 
encourage? Are these effects enduring or do they diminish? How do employees perceive and 
act on environmental performance incentives compared to other organizational priorities? Are 
there any internal conflicts of interest emerging? What other (sustainability) contexts might 
benefit from incentives? Pursuing some or all of these questions should provide both scholars 
and practitioners with valuable insights that extend the well-established body of literature on 
the role of incentives in organizations.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Means for firm level control variables, incentives and environmental performance 
 
 
N Min Max Mean Std Dev. Count 0 Count 1
Environmental Performance 3117 -30.56 71.97 0.10 15.86
Firm size 3101 12.27 21.75 16.51 1.67
R&D Intensity 3117 0.00 33.99 1.56 3.28
Leverage 3100 0.00 114.19 19.16 14.25
ROTA 3101 -121.61 94.97 6.47 8.82
Any Incentive 3117 0 1 0.688 0.463 972 2145
TopLevelOnly 3117 0 1 0.06 0.236 2932 185
MiddleLevelOnly 3117 0 1 0.12 0.321 2753 364
AllEmployeesOnly 3117 0 1 0.15 0.36 2640 477
TopAndMiddle 3117 0 1 0.13 0.333 2722 395
TopAndAllEmpl 3117 0 1 0.03 0.182 3010 107
MiddleAndAllEmpl 3117 0 1 0.07 0.25 2909 208
All3Levels 3117 0 1 0.09 0.289 2830 287
MonetaryOnly 3117 0 1 0.33 0.471 2079 1038
NonMonetaryOnly 3117 0 1 0.09 0.285 2839 278
BothTypes 3117 0 1 0.25 0.435 2329 788
TopOnlyMoney 3117 0 1 0.05 0.213 2969 148
TopOnlyNonMoney 3117 0 1 0.01 0.087 3093 24
TopOnlyBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.054 3108 9
MiddleOnlyMoney 3117 0 1 0.08 0.277 2857 260
MiddleOnlyNonMoney 3117 0 1 0.02 0.142 3053 64
MiddleOnlyBoth 3117 0 1 0.01 0.104 3083 34
AllEmployeesOnlyMoney 3117 0 1 0.06 0.245 2917 200
AllEmployeesOnlyNonMoney 3117 0 1 0.05 0.21 2973 144
AllEmployeesOnlyBoth 3117 0 1 0.04 0.192 2997 120
TopAndMiddleOnlyMoney 3117 0 1 0.09 0.283 2843 274
TopAndMiddleOnlyNonMoney 3117 0 1 0.01 0.082 3096 21
TopAndMiddleOnlyBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.067 3103 14
TopAndAllEmployeesOnlyMoney 3117 0 1 0.01 0.099 3086 31
TopAndAllEmployeesOnlyNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.031 3114 3
TopAndAllEmployeesOnlyBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.031 3114 3
MiddleAndAllEmployeesOnlyMoney 3117 0 1 0.01 0.089 3092 25
MiddleAndAllEmployeesOnlyNonMoney 3117 0 1 0.01 0.091 3091 26
MiddleAndAllEmployeesOnlyBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.044 3111 6
All3LevelsMoney 3117 0 1 0.02 0.129 3064 53
All3LevelsNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.059 3106 11
All3LevelsBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.067 3103 14
TopMoneyMiddleNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.059 3106 11
TopNonMoneyMiddleMoney 3117 0 1 0.01 0.078 3098 19
TopBothMiddleNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.036 3113 4
TopBothMiddleMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.057 3107 10
TopMoneyMiddleBoth 3117 0 1 0.01 0.093 3090 27
TopNonMoneyMiddleBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.057 3107 10
MiddleMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0.03 0.163 3032 85
MiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.051 3109 8
MiddleBothAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0.01 0.074 3100 17
MiddleBothAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.054 3108 9
MiddleMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 1 0.01 0.087 3093 24
MiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.04 3112 5
TopMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0.01 0.101 3085 32
TopNonMoneyAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.036 3113 4
TopBothAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.018 3116 1
TopBothAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.018 3116 1
TopMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 1 0.01 0.094 3089 28
TopNonMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.025 3115 2
TopMoneyMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0.03 0.17 3024 93
TopMoneyMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 1 0.01 0.111 3078 39
TopMoneyMiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.018 3116 1
TopMoneyMiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.031 3114 3
TopMoneyMiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.025 3115 2
TopMoneyMiddleBothAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.025 3115 2
TopMoneyMiddleBothAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.059 3106 11
TopMoneyMiddleBothAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.04 3112 5
TopNonMoneyMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.025 3115 2
TopNonMoneyMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.025 3115 2
TopNonMoneyMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 0 0 0 3117 0
TopNonMoneyMiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.025 3115 2
TopNonMoneyMiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 0 0 0 3117 0
TopNonMoneyMiddleBothAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.031 3114 3
TopNonMoneyMiddleBothAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.036 3113 4
TopNonMoneyMiddleBothAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 0 0 0 3117 0
TopBothMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.036 3113 4
TopBothMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.062 3105 12
TopBothMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 1 0 0.018 3116 1
TopBothMiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.018 3116 1
TopBothMiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 0 0 0 3117 0
TopBothMiddleNonMoneyAllEmployeesBoth 3117 0 0 0 0 3117 0
TopBothMiddleBothAllEmployeesMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.018 3116 1
TopBothMiddleBothAllEmployeesNonMoney 3117 0 1 0 0.059 3106 11
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Table 2: Correlations among key variables 
 
Pearson Correlations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Environmental Performance 1
2 Firm size -.036* 1
3 R&D Intensity 0.026 -.100** 1
4 Leverage -.050** -0.017 -.158** 1
5 ROTA .070** -.164** .078** -.145** 1
6 Any Incentive -0.025 .148** .063** .073** -0.003 1
7 TopLevelOnly 0.018 -0.028 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 .185** 1
8 MiddleLevelOnly -0.008 .039* -0.032 .065** -0.018 .267** -.091** 1
9 AllEmployeesOnly 0.018 0.009 .092** -0.026 -0.028 .313** -.107** -.155** 1
10 TopAndMiddle -0.023 .047** -0.018 .041* .051** .280** -.096** -.139** -.162** 1
11 TopAndAllEmployees -0.001 .038* 0.003 0.019 -0.035 .139** -.047** -.069** -.080** -.072** 1
12 MiddleAndAllEmployees 0.006 .061** .051** -.039* 0.023 .197** -.067** -.097** -.114** -.102** -.050** 1
13 All3Levels -.047** .082** 0.003 .061** 0.002 .234** -.080** -.116** -.135** -.121** -.060** -.085** 1
14 MonetaryOnly -0.01 .039* -0.002 .051** -0.012 .387** .237** .260** .059** .261** -0.017 -.126** -.098**
15 NonMonetaryOnly 0.009 -0.032 .045* 0.006 -0.01 .197** 0.031 .089** .245** -.048** -.040* 0.034 -.053**
16 BothTypes -0.032 .159** 0.031 0.026 0.014 .405** -.115** -.090** .058** 0.027 .186** .312** .371**
17 TopAndMiddleOnlyMoney -0.015 .049** -0.019 .047** .044* .228** -.078** -.113** -.132** .805** -.059** -.083** -.087**
18 MiddleOnlyMoney 0.008 0.032 -0.022 .063** -0.008 .222** -.076** .822** -.128** -.108** -.057** -.081** -.096**
19 AllEmployeesOnlyMoney 0.007 -0.014 0.028 -.040* -.040* .193** -.066** -.095** .616** -.100** -.049** -.070** -.083**
20 TopOnlyMoney 0.007 -0.019 0.002 0.003 -0.012 .164** .863** -.081** -.095** -.071** -.042* -.060** -.066**
21 AllEmployeesOnlyNonMoney 0.004 -0.029 .074** -0.004 0.004 .162** -.055** -.080** .501** -.084** -0.033 -.047** -.065**
22 AllEmployeesOnlyBoth 0 .064** .045* -0.004 -0.006 .147** -.050** -.073** .461** -.076** -0.029 -.047** -.064**
23 TopMoneyMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney -0.028 .057** -0.013 .046* -0.023 .129** -.044* -.064** -.075** -.067** -0.033 -.047** .551**
24 MiddleMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney 0.002 .060** 0.008 -.043* -0.019 .123** -.042* -.061** -.071** -.064** -0.032 .618** -.047**
25 MiddleOnlyNonMoney -0.029 0.009 -0.025 0.031 -0.033 .106** -.036* .391** -.062** -.048** -0.027 -.039* -.046*
26 All3LevelsMoney -0.026 0.027 0.023 -0.003 0.019 .097** -0.033 -.048** -.056** -.050** -0.025 -.035* .413**
Pearson Correlations 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
14 MonetaryOnly 1
15 NonMonetaryOnly -.221** 1
16 BothTypes -.411** -.182** 1
17 TopAndMiddleOnlyMoney .398** -.097** -.136** 1
18 MiddleOnlyMoney .392** -.094** -.138** -.094** 1
19 AllEmployeesOnlyMoney .337** -.082** -.116** -.081** -.079** 1
20 TopOnlyMoney .316** -.070** -.130** -.069** -.067** -.058** 1
21 AllEmployeesOnlyNonMoney -.156** .601** -.061** -.068** -.066** -.058** -.049** 1
22 AllEmployeesOnlyBoth -.141** -.063** .344** -.062** -.060** -.052** -.045* -.044* 1
23 TopMoneyMiddleMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney -.124** -.055** .301** -.054** -.053** -.046* -.039* -.039* -0.035 1
24 MiddleMoneyAllEmployeesNonMoney -.118** -.052** .288** -.052** -.051** -.044* -.037* -.037* -0.034 -0.029 1
25 MiddleOnlyNonMoney -.102** .423** -.058** -.045* -.044* -.038* -0.032 -0.032 -0.029 -0.025 -0.024 1
26 All3LevelsMoney .170** -.041* -.059** -.041* -.040* -0.034 -0.029 -0.029 -0.026 -0.023 -0.022 -0.019 1
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
NB: For simplicity this table only includes the ten most frequent forms of incentive configurations present in the sample
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Table 3: Regression analysis results for incentive main effects 
DV: Environmental Performance
B Sig. Std. Error B Sig. Std. Error B Sig. Std. Error B Sig. Std. Error
Firm size -0.072 0.203 0.128 0.280 0.217 0.282 0.208 0.282
R&D Intensity -0.154 0.110 0.014 0.153 0.022 0.153 0.016 0.153
Leverage -0.022 0.020 -0.041 0.027 -0.039 0.027 -0.040 0.027
ROTA 0.081 *** 0.027 0.111 *** 0.039 0.111 *** 0.039 0.113 *** 0.039
Any Incentives -0.75 0.695
TopLevelOnly 1.112 1.302
MiddleLevelOnly -0.504 1.027
AllEmployeesOnly -0.547 0.954
TopAndMiddle -1.288 1.030
TopAndAllEmployees -1.469 1.689
MiddleAndAllEmployees -0.516 1.285
All3Levels -2.665 ** 1.163
MonetaryOnly -0.908 0.776
NonMonetaryOnly -0.506 1.129
BothTypes -1.841 ** 0.862
Constant YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES
N
R  Square
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1
0.046 0.082 0.084 0.083
3117 3117 3117 3117
Base Model Any Incentives Incentive Hierarchy Incentive Type
1 2 3 4
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Table 4: Regression analysis results for incentive configuration effects 
 
DV: Environmental Performance
B Sig. Std. Error B Sig. Std. Error B Sig. Std. Error
Firm size 0.265 0.284 0.224 0.289 0.243 0.284
R&D Intensity 0.023 0.153 0.050 0.155 0.024 0.154
Leverage -0.038 0.027 -0.041 0.028 -0.038 0.027
ROTA 0.112 *** 0.040 0.108 *** 0.040 0.108 *** 0.039
TopLevelOnly 2.491 1.708 -0.990 4.948 1.682 1.737
MiddleLevelOnly 0.932 1.531 3.849 4.820 1.119 1.617
AllEmployeesOnly 0.913 1.477 9.898 *** 3.551 7.894 ** 3.256
TopAndMiddle 0.26 1.54 4.126 11.788 0.347 1.614
TopAndAllEmployees 0.237 2.071 10.874 7.638 -1.011 2.100
MiddleAndAllEmployees 1.223 1.795 8.142 5.228 0.778 1.939
All3Levels -0.922 1.693 5.072 5.684 -2.503 1.751
MonetaryOnly -1.725 1.377 -0.775 1.653 -1.279 1.438
NonMonetaryOnly -1.369 1.644 4.135 2.981 2.491 2.121
BothTypes -2.2 1.539 1.886 2.326 -0.231 1.650
MiddleOnlyNonMoneyOnly -11.843 ** 5.868 -7.553 *** 2.761
AllEmplOnlyMoneyOnly -10.386 *** 3.979 -7.878 ** 3.546
AllEmplOnlyNonMoneyOnly -13.946 *** 4.628 -10.134 *** 3.787
AllEmplOnlyBoth -13.550 *** 4.411 -9.448 ** 3.662
TopAndMiddleOnlyNonMoneyOnly -16.198 ** 6.932 -6.911 * 4.096
TopMoneyMiddleNonMoney -14.295 * 7.493 -4.368 4.995
TopNonMoneyMiddleMoney -20.591 *** 6.775 -10.681 *** 3.877
MiddleNonMoneyAllEmplMoney -21.568 ** 9.739 -9.464 ** 5.734
MiddleBothAllEmplNonMoney -20.529 ** 8.885 -8.323 ** 4.107
MiddleMoneyAllEmplBoth -14.666 * 8.626 -2.586 3.549
plus 53 other configurations
Constant YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES
N
R Square
Change in R Square
F Change
Significance in F Change
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1
Incentive Configurations
not included
3117
0.094
0.002
(models 5 & 7) 0.09
2.856
0.643
3117 3117
Incentive Hierarchy & Type Incentive Configurations
not signficant
0.085 0.101
(models 5 & 6) 0.017
0.922
5 6 7
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Figure 1: Corporate environmental performance incentive framework 
 
